they typically ignore or explain away his references to divine assistance (e.g., 44-45) and his arguments that our practical need to believe in God justifies hope that a morally-attuned divine being exists. 4 This has given rise to a widespread tendency to assume, even among those who think Kant wanted to take empirical religions seriously, that his philosophy leaves no room for grace, especially in its Christian form as an expression of God's forgiveness of sin through vicarious atonement. Any semblance of grace, according to this common view, is rendered ineffectual by Kant's allegedly Pelagian emphasis on salvation by works. 5 Some scholars in the past few decades have challenged this historically prevalent tendency in various ways. An initial, qualified challenge came in two articles by Philip Quinn.
The first 6 examines the relevant passages of Religion, portraying Kant's theory of atonement as focusing, like Anselm's, on the need to satisfy divine justice. While praising Kant for avoiding some pitfalls that plague Anselm's approach, Quinn also raises two "serious objections" against Kant, 7 concluding that Kant leaves us in a muddle over how vicarious atonement actually works.
In a sequel, 8 Quinn recounts his understanding of Kantian grace, expanding his objections by noting certain inconsistencies between Kant's theory of "saving faith" and Christian Kant's Ethics of Grace -2 understandings of vicarious atonement. As I shall argue in §4, interpreting Kant's position as an ethics of grace effectively neutralizes Quinn's allegation that Kant adopts a position antithetical to orthodox Christian faith.
A more robust defense of Kantian grace appeared in an article by Jacqueline Mariña, 9 who offers "an analysis of the deep structure of Kant's views on divine justice and grace" that shows Kant's position, far from being Pelagian, to be consistent with "an authentically Christian understanding". 10 Quoting from a wide variety of Kant's texts, Mariña demonstrates that for Kant "divine justice is punitive and not remunerative": because human beings are never entirely good and because God wills the happiness of all, any happiness we enjoy is a sign of "unmerited grace". 11 The good life conduct Kant emphasizes in Religion does not earn a person the right to divine grace, but only makes one receptive to a gift God must freely give (if it is to be available at all). Carefully distinguishing between grace in general and two, more specific types of Kantian grace, Mariña defends Kant's argument against the specific objections raised by Quinn and by several other interpreters less sympathetic to Kant's approach.
Yet old habits die hard, for despite the persuasiveness of Mariña's defense of Kantian grace against the charges of unorthodoxy and/or incoherence, some interpreters have continued to portray Kant's theory as an empty shell with little or no relevance to the concerns of actual religious believers. What is missing from previous interpretations such as those of Quinn and Mariña, I shall argue, is a clear awareness that one of Kant's central aims is to assess the ethical difficulties that arise for any theology of grace, not to develop his own theoretical account of how grace might occur.
The tendency to misread Kant as proposing a theology of grace, and to find him wanting as a result, is nowhere better illustrated than in Peter Byrne's recent book, Kant on God. While granting the affirmative interpreters' claim that Kant sometimes clearly tries to make room for Kant's Ethics of Grace -3 divine grace, Byrne also echoes the conventional claim that Kant never unequivocally defends this important feature of religious belief. He distinguishes between three types of grace that operate in Kant's writings: distributive, transforming, and justifying grace. 12 In the Dialectic of the second Critique Kant portrays God as distributing happiness (presumably, to justified believers) according to each person's inner disposition, not according to outward conduct. Byrne devotes most of his attention to examining this type of grace, with its close association to Kant's moral argument for God's existence -a central focus of Byrne's book.
Of the three types, Byrne thinks only distributive grace does "any real work" for Kant, 13 yet this type relates mainly to technical issues arising out of the second Critique. Byrne acknowledges that Kant's appeal to the other two types, mainly in Religion, sets him apart from Enlightenment deists; but he regards this appeal as non-essential to the concerns of Kant's Critical system. 14 In what follows I shall challenge this claim by examining how Kant solves three ethical difficulties that arise out of any belief in divine assistance, including his own account in Religion's Second Piece. Kant's treatment of these difficulties suggests that the grace discussed in Religion is distinct from (and does not necessarily entail) the distribution of happiness in proportion to virtue that plays such a crucial role in the second Critique. Examining the details of Byrne's distributive grace is therefore irrelevant to our present concerns. 15 However, I shall return to his qualified dismissal of Kantian grace in §4, when assessing the practical relevance Kant's ethics of grace has for ordinary religious believers.
Because appealing to grace presupposes belief in sin, and sin is often treated as a philosophically objectionable belief, some readers expect Kant to show no serious interest in grace. Yet in the First Piece Kant defends a position he explicitly describes as expressing essentially the same meaning as the Christian doctrine of original sin (see note 19, below). The crucial difference, Kant claims, is that the latter typically refers to the origin of evil in time (i.e., identifying who the first sinner was), whereas his theory of the "evil propensity" that infects human nature at its root is about the origin of evil in reason (Religion 39f). He claims our decision-making capacity, our rational power to make free choices, inevitably tends to be grounded in a preference for choosing evil, starting from our first choice. 16 This stance, properly understood, requires Kant to appeal to grace in the Second Piece; as he predicts near the end of the First Piece (44-47), divine assistance may be necessary to release human beings from the selfdeception caused by the radical evil that inevitably infects our reason. Why, then, does Kant step lightly around any direct appeal to grace when constructing his arguments in the Second Piece?
Kant's Ethics of
Kant's non-committal treatment of grace stems directly from his fundamental claim, upheld throughout the three Critiques, that practical reason has priority over theoretical reason.
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The ethical implications of being religious (i.e., the practical outcome of adopting a given set of religious beliefs and practices) therefore matter to Kant far more than the abstract, metaphysical status of any theological doctrine. Consistent with this principle, we find throughout Religion, especially in the Second Piece, that Kant repeatedly warns his readers of the ethical dangers that may arise for those who conceive of religion as requiring elements that go beyond the duty to follow a good way of life (e.g., 62). Whatever else authentic religion may be, according to Kant, it must not become an excuse for moral laziness or immoral behavior (by either individuals or groups of alleged "believers"). In particular, he warns (66f) that believers who ground their hope of salvation entirely on the claim that God will change (or has supernaturally changed) them from being morally corrupt to being morally "good" are likely to fall victim to three religious illusions, whose basic features we shall review in §2.
One of Kant's chief concerns in the Second Piece, entitled "On the Struggle of the Good
[Principle] with the Evil Principle for Dominion over the Human Being" (Religion 57), is to warn Kant's Ethics of Grace -5 religious readers of the dangers of such self-deceptions. A person's evil propensity does not go away simply because he or she affirms a religious creed (e.g., 93-94); or, in response to one who believes God's grace does take away a person's evil propensity, 18 Kant points out (67-71) that we can never know for certain that such a wholesale transformation has actually taken place in any given individual's case. For ethical reasons alone, Kant thinks religious people ought to be cautious in affirming any specific theoretical doctrines about divine assistance.
Those who succumb to such religious illusions are likely to follow what Kant describes in the Third and Fourth Pieces as false religion. Yet his cautious treatment of how one believes in divine assistance does not mean he positively rejects grace. A careful reading of the Second Piece reveals that Kant is aiming to reform the believer's understanding of grace rather than destroy it.
Kant's goal is to reinterpret the Christian doctrine of grace in a way that renders it both philosophically coherent and ethically empowering, just as he claimed to do for the doctrine of original sin in the First Piece. 19 The goal of the First and Second Pieces, taken together, is to establish that, without belief in an ethically empowering conception of divine grace, ethical goodness becomes an impossible task. Kant's arguments in the main passage where he addresses the three difficulties that tend to arouse illusory forms of religious belief (i.e., Religion 66-78) are often dismissed by interpreters as (at best) poorly argued or (at worst) nonsensical.
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Such assessments arise when interpreters neglect the thoroughly perspectival character of Kant's philosophy, 21 remaining closed to what Mariña calls the "deep structure" of his arguments.
Kant's main purpose in Section One of Religion's Second Piece is to explain the conditions we must fulfill in order to overcome the effect our evil propensity has on our moral character. Adopting the transcendental perspective (see note 16, above), the First Piece portrayed radical evil as the boundary condition that initially gives rise to the need for religion. The Second Piece then adopts the logical perspective to explain how the internal presence of a divine Word Kant's Ethics of Grace -6 (λόγοζ), or "archetype", can empower religious believers to return the good principle to its rightful place of sovereignty over the will. Subsection A (Religion 60-62) argues that bare reason recognizes in itself an unfulfilled need that can be met only by this λόγοζ taking on human form, as a perfect example of moral goodness. Subsection B (62-66) argues that, because human beings are aware of this need and can identify such an example, this archetype must be an internal reality that can empower a person to effect a conversion from evil-heartedness to good. Although human beings may need a real historical example of an ideal person in order to be aware of this inner power, authentic religion calls each person to become such an example of goodness. Reconciling this need with the three illusions that tend to accompany any belief in grace is Kant's central task in Subsection C (67-78), where he defends what I am here calling his "ethics of grace".
The Tendency of Grace to Encourage Moral Laziness
Although only three of the 39 occurrences of "grace" (Gnade or Gnaden) and its equivalents in Religion appear in Subsection C, this is where we find Kant's most thorough discussion of the ethical dangers confronting a person who believes in divine grace. Kant's arguments in this passage are typically not regarded as successfully defending a doctrine of grace because he never focuses on, or clearly explains from God's perspective, how grace is actually implemented. This apparent omission ceases to be disconcerting, once we recognize that he is here not constructing a theology but an ethics of grace: a philosophical defense of how a person can choose to believe in divine assistance without thereby becoming morally lazy, and of why a person might choose such practical faith rather than trust solely in the merits of good life conduct. 22 Kant's ethics of grace, his explanation of the proper relationship between grace and virtue, reaches a climax near the end of Section One, where he reveals that the whole topic of Kant's Ethics of Grace -7 Subsection C concerns "that surplus beyond the merit of works" (75) that "is a merit that is imputed to us by grace." He then summarizes his foregoing argument (75-76):
For that what, in our case, … is always only in [a state of] mere becoming (namely, to be a human being pleasing to God) should be imputed to us as if we were already in full possession of it here -to this, after all, we surely have (according to empirical selfcognition) no legal claim* insofar as we are acquainted with ourselves in that way (gauge our disposition 23 not directly but only according to our deeds), so that the prosecutor within us would still be more likely to propose a judgment of condemnation. It is therefore always only a verdict of grace, although fully in conformity with eternal justice (as based on a satisfaction thereof which for us resides only in the idea of the improved disposition but with which God alone is acquainted), when we for the sake of that good in our faith are unburdened of all responsibility.
Kant's footnote to the quoted paragraph defines grace as "the decree of a superior to bestow a good for which the subordinate has nothing but the (moral) receptivity" (75n). Here, and only here in Subsection C, does Kant explicitly define grace. But this need not be treated as an oversight, if his purpose in these pages is not to theologize, but to explain how one can believe in such a decree without becoming ethically lazy.
As I noted in §1, Kant argues in Subsection A that an "archetype" within every person provides an idea or image of what living a life of constant dependence on the "good principle" would entail, and that faith in this archetype can empower us to overcome the debilitating influence of the radical evil infecting our nature as rational beings who are free, yet also products of physical nature. Subsection B assesses the proper role of examples in such "practical faith" (Religion 62): that we can identify perfection in another person, such as Jesus, means we must Kant's Ethics of Grace -8 first possess the idea of a perfect person within ourselves; so each person must strive to make oneself that perfect example. In this context, Subsection C examines three "Difficulties Opposing the Reality of This Idea" (66) of an inner archetype of perfection that we can call upon to empower our ethical decision-making. Solving these difficulties forms the core of Kant's account of why rational persons who wish to be good cannot depend merely on their own conduct, but are better off appealing to divine grace. However, if calling upon this all-important idea itself becomes a form of self-deception, only weakening a person's moral resolve instead of strengthening it, then practical reason would be forced to discard the archetype, and all religion based on such an idea would be a dead end -at least as far as its goal of empowering ethical behavior is concerned.
What, then, are the three ethical difficulties Kant is so worried about? They are well known, as Kant's account of each is frequently summarized in the literature; 24 because our focus here is on how Kant solves these difficulties, a brief initial paraphrase of each illusion, and the difficulty it creates, will suffice. First, believers in grace tell themselves they are "saved", yet they often continue to behave in a way that a good God would regard as morally deficient. How could God overlook the evil deeds a believer continues to commit, after conversion? Divine assistance to those who are saved by grace seems to require God to turn a blind eye to real evil, thus inadvertently encouraging religious people to continue doing evil with a clear conscience, in the belief that God sees them as "good" regardless of how bad their conduct may be. If this is what grace entails, then the idea of an archetype of perfection obviously lacks "reality" (Religion 66) inasmuch as it thwarts the practical goal it claims to reach. Kant's portrayal of grace attempts to solve this problem.
Second, an alleged certainty of having been declared blameless before God, now and forever, may lead to moral laziness even among those who really have become good in God's Kant's Ethics of Grace -9 eyes, causing them to lapse into a way of life that a good God could not possibly endorse. Can religious believers know for certain that God has assisted them in an eternally efficacious way?
Many people claim such absolute certainty; but if this is possible, to the extent that even God could not "unsave" such persons, then what would prevent grace-filled believers from falling back into the evil ways that necessitated their conversion in the first place? Any theory of divine assistance that leads to such an outcome, including Kant's own theory of the archetype, would encourage belief in something that lacks reality, at least for the practical (ethical) purpose of becoming a better person.
Third and perhaps most dangerously deceptive of all, believers might think they are no longer responsible for their pre-conversion life, because God has forgiven them for their past evil.
This understanding of divine grace lies at the core of Christian theology, so Kant's assessment is historically accurate when he says it offers the "greatest" challenge (Religion 71) to anyone attempting to construct an ethics of grace. How can a good God forgive evil deeds done prior to a person's conversion without wholly ignoring the requirements of justice implied by the moral law? Christianity teaches, and Kant sometimes affirms (e.g., 73-77), that the only way to conceive of God as forgiving believers for pre-conversion evil is for someone else to be punished for that evil. Yet Kant assumes (without argument) that an ethical interpretation of religion requires each person to be responsible for his or her own choices. Belief in vicarious atonement would therefore seem to destroy the practical reality of the idea that religious believers themselves become perfect through their faith in the inner archetype. If it is not me, but Jesus, whom God sees as the "perfect individual", then ethically, religious belief is a sham: I can remain as mired as ever in the radical evil I hoped to escape by affirming a belief in salvation by grace.
Here, as in each of the three difficulties, the explanation of grace commonly accepted by Christians, often promoted by their pastors, and sometimes even defended by theologians, fails to Kant's Ethics of Grace -10 protect believers from experiencing potentially dire consequences for their ethical integrity. Such a belief may cause the religious person to be less able to live a good life, rather than providing a newfound power to do so. Belief in divine grace would then defeat the ethical purpose of being religious. What readers of Subsection C must constantly keep in mind, in order to understand how and why Kant solves these difficulties, is that any theoretical claims he makes are presented solely to show how philosophers well-tuned to the workings of practical reason can protect believers from deceiving themselves: people affirming a theological belief in divine assistance (whatever the details may be) must supplement it with an ethics of grace.
Kant's Antidote to Moral Laziness: Solving the Three Ethical Difficulties
While the nature of the three difficulties Kant finds with any theology of grace is well known and tends to be understood fairly accurately by his interpreters, the depth and power of his solutions have never been fully appreciated. In this section I shall fill that gap by explaining how Kant's solution to each difficulty relies on a basic hermeneutic strategy: whereas those who interpret grace in an overly simplistic, non-perspectival way end up compromising their ethical integrity, those who adopt a perspectival interpretation are empowered to live a more authentic, ethically-motivated life. I shall focus mainly on Kant's solution to the third difficulty, for although it is the most important, it is also the most obscure of his solutions, so it has been the easiest to dismiss without serious consideration.
Kant's response to all three difficulties is grounded in a perspectival understanding of what religious belief entails: to be both genuinely religious and fully rational, a person must believe in a God who perceives the spatio-temporal details of human beings' lives as a completed whole, from a "noumenal" perspective unavailable to human beings. By contrast, we human beings are limited to the "phenomenal" perspective, whereby we perceive only specific deeds and Kant's Ethics of Grace -11 choices in isolation from the totality that makes up a person's moral life. By remembering that they cannot have knowledge of the noumenal and that human judgments regarding a person's ethical condition must be based only on phenomenal evidence, religious believers can effectively protect themselves against ethical illusion. The ethical obstacles that threaten to prevent a morally sensitive, rational person from believing in divine grace can likewise be cleared away, provided we interpret grace within this framework -a framework wholly consistent with (indeed, determined by) Kant's Critical philosophy.
This perspectival framework, with its core distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, lies at the heart not only of Kant's epistemology, moral philosophy, and aesthetics, but also of his account of the nature and purpose of religion. Of course, such references to "noumenal reality" are the brunt of much criticism of Kant's entire philosophy, including his theory of religion, with its apparent dependence on the mysterious notion of a "timeless choice". The phenomena-noumena distinction is intimately bound up with a perspectival distinction Kant makes in the first Critique, between "empirical" reality, the "transcendental" conditions that make that reality possible, and the "transcendent" reality (if any) that lies out beyond the limits of Kant observes that complete assurance of salvation is likely to be as detrimental to a believer's moral condition as a total lack of any basis for confidence would be. Rational persons Kant's Ethics of Grace -13 who presume to know God has irreversibly saved them might as well choose to relax and live a self-centered, essentially evil life, since their eternal destiny is a "done deal". Divine assistance would then have an unethical result and the morally sensitive rational person would have to regard grace as yet another example of our tendency to be duped by the radical evil that infects human reason at its root. Likewise, those who deny the possibility of possessing any evidence as to whether or not they are saved would be likely to stop trying to live a good life. Kant solves this difficulty by appealing once again to his perspectival framework, requiring believers to focus on their phenomenal choices rather than claiming to have knowledge of a noumenal reality that is beyond human grasp. Certainty on such matters is possible only from God's perspective, a perspective we human beings can never hope to adopt. Instead, religious believers must always assess the eternal status of their disposition by appealing to life conduct, for this phenomenal perspective on the status of moral character is the only means we have for obtaining evidence of whether or not we have been transformed by God's grace. That our assessments will always remain imperfect is not ethically problematic, for the goal of focusing on continual progress is not to obtain certainty of salvation, but to guard against moral laziness.
The interpretation of divine grace Kant defended in response to the first difficulty gives believers who remain morally diligent (i.e., those who think they observe progress toward the goal of perfection in their experience since conversion) a reason to hope that from God's point of view their salvation is secure. Such hope thereby empowers religious believers to work even harder, without tempting them (as do either of the extreme alternatives) to stop working on moral self-improvement. This solves the second difficulty by enabling a person to continue believing in the transforming efficacy of divine grace, without having an excuse to be morally lazy, as a claim to certainty would provide. By requiring those who believe in grace to regard it as noumenal, thus appealing only to the (uncertain) phenomenal evidence of moral improvement as a basis for Kant's Ethics of Grace -14 religious hope, Kant remains well within the limits of knowledge set by the first Critique.
Kant's response to the third difficulty is less straightforward; if read theologically, it appears at first to be a concocted solution with no tangible effect on a believer's practical empowerment. Yet when taken as the third step in a systematic attempt to construct an ethics of grace, it turns out to be the most profound of the three solutions. Along with orthodox Christian theologians, Kant assumes that the ethical requirements of divine justice can be satisfied only if some punishment is dealt out to compensate for the evil done prior to a person's conversion (Religion 72-74) and that conversion entails the believer becoming a "new person" from the moral standpoint, even though from the standpoint of one's physical nature, one remains the selfsame individual. We would expect to account for the timing of God's punishment by locating it either before or after the conversion experience (73); but Kant rejects both options. Human experience fails to provide consistent evidence that God punishes evil-hearted people directly for their evil; often, those who choose to do evil seem happier than good people, for they intentionally pursue their own happiness before considering the demands of the moral law. 25 Moreover, the price for pre-conversion evil cannot have been paid by suffering endured before conversion, because this would imply that an evil-hearted person (one who has not experienced conversion) is in no need of God's grace, having already paid the price for the evil done! Yet the punishment also cannot occur after conversion, because at this point, a genuinely converted person has a good disposition and is thereby not worthy of being judged evil. In the process of solving the first difficulty Kant has already explained how a just and righteous God could save such a person without needing to administer any post-conversion punishment.
In typical Critical fashion, Kant solves this dilemma by appealing to a middle way hidden between the two extremes: if the punishment that atones for a person's pre-conversion evil can occur neither before nor after the person's conversion, it must "be thought as commensurate with Kant's Ethics of Grace -15 this change and carried out in the state of the change of mentality itself" (Religion 73). What could this mean? For if conversion involves a change of disposition, and if its noumenal nature means that only God has unobstructed access to the human disposition, then how could a "change" in this "timeless" aspect of our nature have an effect in the phenomenal world? Kant's argument appears to be as meaningless as the worst examples of scholastic hair-splitting; if we read this as an attempt to construct a theology of grace, he might as well be asking us to decide how many angels can stand together on the head of a pin! Unfortunately, Kant offers precious little clue as to what he has in mind, so not surprisingly, interpreters tend to reject this and all his solutions as "ambiguous" and "unsatisfactory". 26 Interpreting Kant's third solution as the climax of his defense of an ethics of grace gives it considerably more practical force. We can then understand his argument as follows: the experience of conversion just is the deeply painful choice to submit one's ethical decisionmaking processes to a new foundational principle. The "old person" was someone for whom evil choices tended to cause intense pleasure, while no pain seemed more unbearable than being forced to do a good deed one would rather avoid. Guilt is a remote and rare feeling for such a person. For the "new person", by contrast, evil choices cause a pain of guilt more intense than anything the "old person" ever experienced. While all human persons tend to feel some of the "pain" Kant identifies as respect for the moral law 27 -for even the most deeply spiritual persons have physical and sensuously-conditioned inclinations -the primary mark of growth in one's moral life (or of sanctification in one's religious life) is that this pain gradually develops into a deep contentment when one has decided (noumenally) to base one's moral choices on the good principle. Since the experience of conversion is not necessarily sudden, but may extend over a lengthy portion of a person's life, the existence of such "pain" can be taken as empirical evidence that one is still "in the state" of undergoing such a phenomenal change (i.e., of being sanctified).
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An easily neglected aspect of Kant's solution to the third difficulty is that, even though he depicts the crucial pain and suffering under consideration as happening during the conversion experience, he also says the new, post-conversion person suffers vicariously on behalf of the old, pre-conversion person: in deciding, once and for all, to aim at living a virtuous life, a person undergoing a conversion agrees 28 to experience the aforementioned pain of ever-increasing guilt;
for the closer one comes to being holy (or sanctified), the more one becomes aware of the depths of one's failings. Kant's claim is that the painful awareness accompanying a conversion experience, that my moral disposition must be turned completely around in order for me to receive divine grace, constitutes the phenomenal "punishment" that enables God to forgive my pre-conversion evil. Focusing on this deeply painful experience, whereby a person realizes his or her past life has been so mired in evil that the only hope is to "die" (82) to "the old human being" (74) and commit oneself, with God's help, to carrying one's cross down the never-ending path of self-improvement (73-78), enables us to understand how God can forgive pre-conversion evil while avoiding the danger of allowing believers to be morally lazy. Kant is suggesting, therefore, that the empirical evidence that a person has been morally receptive to the atoning work of Jesus (or any other theological basis for divine grace) is that the person must seek to conduct his or her life in a manner that amounts to the imitation of Christ's sufferings -a theme he develops further in Section Two of the Second Piece. Unfortunately, examining the precise nature of this pain and the psychology of conversion it implies is beyond the scope of the present essay. Let it suffice to say that, in order to overcome the ethical difficulty created by a belief in justification, we must acknowledge the importance of the psychologically painful experience of sanctification as evidence that the required (noumenal) change has occurred. While this is consistent with the position many of the great Christian theologians have defended down through the centuries, 29 it is lost in much of the popular theology that is the target of Kant's criticism in Religion. Byrne covers sanctification under the heading "transforming grace", describing it as "the alleged divine ability and willingness materially to assist in transforming the evil human being into the good human being". 32 On Byrne's reading, Kant has no serious interest in either transforming grace or justifying grace, except insofar as these are in some sense "analogous" to distributive grace. Every evil action must be regarded, when one seeks its rational origin, as if the human being had fallen into it directly from the state of innocence. For however his previous conduct may have been, and of whatever kind may be the natural causes influencing him, and likewise whether they are to be found within or outside him, his action is nonetheless free and not determined by any of these causes, and it therefore can and must always be judged as an original use of his power of choice. He should have refrained from the action, whatever the circumstances of time and the connections in which he may have been; for through no cause in the world can he cease to be a freely acting being. It is indeed rightly said that one imputes to the human being also the consequences arising from his former free but unlawful acts; but this means only that one has no need to venture into the subterfuge of establishing whether the consequences may be free or not, because, in the admittedly free action that was their cause, sufficient ground for imputation is already available.
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Kant's Affirmation of Grace as a Noumenal Idea with Religious Power
Given that Kantian freedom is a noumenal reality, not conditioned by phenomenal causes and effects, the "free action" Kant refers to here is obviously an example of noumenal (or timeless) choice. He is not saying our empirical situation is wholly irrelevant, but only that when assessing a person's moral character (based as it is on what is universal in human nature), our usual, phenomenal perspective on our actions cannot show us the disposition as such. The temporal Kant's Ethics of Grace -20 effects of our free choice may be relevant to an earthly judge when determining the precise extent of our accountability for an evil (or good) act; but this is not what determines the bare (noumenal) fact that we are accountable.
The above-quoted passage reveals that the elusive timeless "action" whereby we choose the evil propensity is not some mysterious pre-birth experience that takes place in an imaginary (mythical) realm beyond time and space. Rather, Kant's argument is that each and every moral choice can be viewed from two perspectives: viewed transcendentally, a moral action is grounded in a noumenal choice that makes us responsible for whatever we end up doing to implement that choice; viewed empirically, the same action takes place in time and space and may be influenced by all manner of exigencies. Insofar as such empirical causes are beyond our control, they may influence how accountable we are. 34 Nevertheless, there are not two choices, nor two acts, but only one choice, one act, that we can interpret from two perspectives. The same must be true of the free act whereby a person brings about a "change of Sinnesänderung".
On this perspectival interpretation, "timeless" and "noumenal" refer not to some mysterious other world, but to a special way of viewing the ordinary moral choices we make while living our phenomenal lives. Kant concludes the above-quoted paragraph by insisting (Religion 41): "We therefore cannot inquire into the temporal origin of this deed, but must inquire merely into its rational origin, in order thereafter to determine and, if possible, explain the propensity, if there is one, i.e., the subjective universal basis for the admission of a transgression into our maxim." Any talk of a free choice to correct this propensity to evil in our nature must likewise be interpreted as an appeal to a change in our underlying moral character, our disposition. A good example of Kant's appeal to such a perspectival interpretation of grace comes in the footnote he appends to the last paragraph dealing with the third difficulty in Subsection C.
Clarifying his solution to the third difficulty, Kant's footnote at Religion 74n-75n
Kant's Ethics of Grace -21 emphasizes how our dual nature requires us to adopt two perspectives on punishment and justification:
Even the purest moral disposition still produces in the human being, as a being of the world, nothing more than a continual becoming of a subject who is pleasing to God in terms of the deed (which is found in the world of sense). In terms of quality this disposition (since it must be thought as suprasensibly based) ought to and can indeed be holy and conforming to the disposition of the human being's archetype; in terms of degree -as it reveals itself in actions -it always remains deficient and infinitely far removed from that archetype's disposition. In spite of this, because this disposition contains the basis for continual progress in compensating for this deficiency, it takes the place of the deed in its perfection.
Viewed from the noumenal perspective of its supersensible nature, the "quality" of our moral nature "can indeed be holy and conforming to the disposition of the human being's archetype".
Yet, viewed from the phenomenal perspective of the "degree" of conformity apparent in one's day-to-day actions, a person's moral status is (at best) in a perpetual process of improvement, for it always falls short of the goal of being "pleasing to God" -both "in life on earth" and "perhaps also in all future times and in all worlds" (75). The perfected disposition atones for this "deficiency" in life-conduct by standing in place of such "continual progress" in a person's actions, when viewed from God's perspective -something we human beings can never do in any given case.
Kant's long footnote concludes by observing, ironically, that good-hearted persons will experience divine punishment as both cause and effect of their good life-conduct, as well as of their "contentment" with the paradoxes involved in living a moral life (Religion 75n):
of this [i.e., the moral agent's "willing reception of those ills and sufferings as so many Kant's Ethics of occasions for testing and practicing his disposition toward the good"] even that punishment is the effect and simultaneously the cause, and hence is so also of that satisfaction and moral happiness which consists in the consciousness of his progress in the good (which is one with the act of the abandonment of evil). In the old disposition, by contrast, the very same ills would have to have not only counted as punishments but also been sensed as such, because even considered as mere ills they are still directly opposed to what the human being in such a disposition makes his single goal by way of physical happiness.
Because the noumenal "act of the abandonment of evil" is "one with" a person's "consciousness of his [phenomenal] progress in the good", one who recognizes this unity may regard this act as entailing a divine "punishment" that paradoxically produces "moral happiness" despite the earthly "ills" a good person must endure. By contrast, when those who remain mired in an evil disposition are deprived of fulfilled inclinations, they adopt only the phenomenal perspective, counting "the very same ills … as punishments", for this is how they have "been sensed" (i.e., how they appear to one's physical nature); the "single goal" for such persons is to obtain the "physical happiness" that is possible only by fulfilling inclinations. The best way to assess whether one's underlying disposition is good or evil is to identify which of these opposing attitudes one adopts toward the sufferings and ills experienced in this life.
Properly understanding the subtlety of Kant's suggestion that the punishment for past evil occurs during the change of heart enables us to clarify what he thinks a noumenal act is. The solution to the third difficulty implies that, in one sense, the required punishment takes place all in a flash, at the (timeless) moment when a person's disposition changes from evil to good. This solution to the problem of justification, Kant says, is "suprasensibly based" (i.e., noumenal). Yet, such a change makes practical sense (i.e., avoids encouraging the moral laziness at the root of all Kant's Ethics of Grace -23 three ethical difficulties) only if we appeal (with Kant) to the religious symbolism of an archetype who has already completed this work. 35 This archetype, viewed from the phenomenal perspective, is a person who continually strives to realize in actions the goodness already perfected in the disposition. To explain how a person, following the archetype, can experience a "continual becoming" in (empirical) moral decision-making, we must assume a "one-off decision" has been made from the noumenal perspective, a religious conversion whereby the person adopts a new way of interpreting the pain and suffering of living an earthly life; while this change is likely to increase one's suffering (viewed phenomenally), the converted person gradually learns (through faith in the efficacy of God's noumenal perspective) to interpret such experiences not as painful but with contentment and joy.
Kant sometimes seems to affirm the traditional Christian belief that Jesus plays a unique role in the human race's ability to achieve such a moral revolution (e.g., Religion 80, [158] [159] [160] [161] [162] and that each person's salvation somehow (at least in a symbolic sense) depends on Jesus' accomplishment (60-62, 119); yet he also affirms the Enlightenment philosophical belief that each person still has a duty to make the good principle the sovereign force in his or her will. The divine gift of the archetype may be free, but believers must do something to appropriate the righteousness it offers as their own. Kant's portrayal of grace as a noumenal idea in Subsection C need not be dismissed as a muddle of lazy thinking; nor is it merely a "wild card" appeal to an unknowable mystery, comparable to the proverbial pink elephant. Instead, it functions as an ethical safety-measure intended to supplement any Christian (or other) theology of grace: by forcing them to admit ignorance of how grace operates, Kant's position prevents believers from falling victim to an unethical application of theological doctrine, thereby providing them with the moral empowerment needed to persevere on the path of goodness. Viewing grace as a noumenal idea empowers believers by reminding them to ground the belief that they have received grace on Kant's Ethics of Grace -24 the phenomenal evidence of their changed life-conduct. In this way, Kant can both uphold salvation by grace alone (noumenally) and insist that believers must nevertheless endeavor to lead good lives (phenomenally).
Kant's solution to the three difficulties inherent in any belief in grace is considerably richer, and more amenable to a theology that offers believers access to a real, life-transforming power, than past interpreters have recognized. While Byrne's recent efforts to examine and assess Kant's appeal to divine assistance are a refreshing alternative to the more negatively-inclined interpretations of the past, they do not go far enough along the path forged by scholars such as Quinn and Mariña. The interpretive key to resolving the conundrums of Kant's account is to recognize that he neither reduces grace to an optional extra, nor (even worse) dismisses it as nothing but the ravings of enthusiastic religious fanatics; rather, he rescues it from a far more perilous fate, whereby belief in divine assistance encourages moral laziness, thus becoming a self-deceptive tool of radical evil that keeps one mired in an unethical way of life. Kant's appeal to the noumenal guards against such laziness, by requiring that we human beings must view our lives from the "progress" perspective, yet permitting us to hope God views our lives from the noumenal perspective. The conduct we interpret as phenomenal progress does not "save" a person; it only provides the evidence that a noumenal change (an inner "revolution" [Religion 47-48]) has taken place; the divine wisdom has arranged the human situation so that we cannot know this noumenal reality, for this necessary ignorance is precisely what prevents us from being morally lazy. Kant is a philosopher, not a theologian, so he never claims to explain how grace happens; but neither does he deny the possibility of Christian (or other forms of) salvation.
Rather, he brings together the warring parties he sees as his readers (theologians or religious believers who disdain philosophy on the one hand and irreligious philosophers or atheists on the other) by explaining how a person can believe in divine grace, even salvation by faith in the Kant's Ethics of Grace -25 atoning sacrifice of Jesus, without becoming unethical.
Quinn (1986) raises two objections to Kant's theory that Mariña addresses, but only partially resolves. First (457), "Kantian justification is not merely mysterious; it is, on Kantian principles, utterly unjustified." But if Kant's aim is not to theologize about grace, this objection is misplaced; Kant merely needs to show how someone who chooses to believe in grace (whatever their reasons may be!) can avoid moral laziness. Ultimately for Kant, the question of human salvation can be answered by God alone. Second, Quinn claims that on Kantian principles, if God declares that a person who still sometime sins is nevertheless righteous, this implies a "laxness" in divine justice that "would be a moral outrage" (458). However, this objection neglects the perspectival grounding of Kant's argument. Such an objection only holds in the case of human judges, who must depend on phenomenal evidence alone (see note 34, above). Kant's God does not base the decree of righteousness on phenomenal evidence; only we do that! God's decree of righteousness must be based on a noumenal disposition that (for a converted person) fully complies with the moral law and therefore involves no injustice on God's part.
Similarly, Adams objects: "Kant really has no explanation of how moral progress could deserve to be counted as perfected holiness" (xxiv). Thus he poignantly asks "What's the point of imputed righteousness for a Kantian?" The point, I have argued, is that belief in such (prevenient!) grace empowers a good-hearted person to continue the struggle toward phenomenal perfection. Adams misleadingly thinks Kant's appeal to progress requires a mixture of good and evil influences on the noumenal level that Kant, with his previously defended "rigorist" stance, requiring a person's disposition always to be "either morally good or morally evil" and never both (Religion 22), would firmly reject. Adams thinks the claim that the post-conversion noumenal self is entirely good, from God's perspective, amounts to "denying the reality of sin and classifying it as merely an appearance" (xix). Yet this is no more true for Kant than it is for Kant's Ethics of traditional Christian doctrine. Like the latter, Kant's position is that sin (radical evil) affects us on two levels: before conversion, it has a noumenal grip on our disposition and thus total control over our phenomenal choices; but after conversion, God (accurately) views the perfected disposition as sinless, even though we continue to struggle in our phenomenal choices as we progress toward the good. Adams is correct to say Kant places his hope in phenomenal "progress" as "the temporal expression of the timeless reality" (xix-xx); his mistake is to think this implies that a continuing struggle exists at the noumenal level as well.
Properly understood, belief in grace is not to be dismissed as an aberration or a sign of undue weakness, but affirmed as a central goal of Kant's whole argument in Religion, and as at least consistent with (if not also grounded by) his Critical system. 
